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The Iowa GamblingTask (IGT) simulates uncertain gains and losses in real life situations and
thus is a good measure of uncertain decision-making. The role of working memory (WM)
in IGT performance still remains unclear. The present study aimed to examine the effect
of WM on IGT performance. Three groups of participants matched on gender ratio were
randomly assigned to no WM load, low WM load, and high WM load conditions. Initially the
three groups did not show signiﬁcant difference inWM capacity. They ﬁnished a modiﬁed
version of IGT and then their implicit learning effect and explicit cognition on IGT were
assessed. Results indicated a linear increasing trend of IGT performance among highWM
load, low WM load and no WM load groups; participants in the no WM load and low WM
load groups revealed implicit learning effect, while participants in the highWM load group
did not; all participants showed explicit cognition on IGT to the same level. These results
suggested that participants in the high WM load group showed good explicit cognition to
IGT but showed poor performance.This pattern is similar to frontal patients. Further studies
should be conducted to explore this issue.
Keywords: Iowa GamblingTask, uncertain decision-making, working memory, somatic marker hypothesis, implicit
learning
INTRODUCTION
IGT AND UNCERTAIN DECISION-MAKING
Decision-making is closely related to people’s life, and usually a
certain degree of uncertainty is involved in decision-making (Platt
and Huettel, 2008). The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) simulates
the uncertainty of gains and losses in real life situations through
the setting of monetary reward and punishments (Bechara et al.,
1994). It is a good analogy of the uncertain decision-making in
daily life and received much attention and studies since it is being
developed. In the task, participants were presentedwith four decks
of cards and asked to select cards from these decks to earn as much
money as possible. Of these four decks, two show large imme-
diate wins but sometimes even larger losses thus cause loss upon
repeated plays in the long run, so they are disadvantageous decks.
The other two decks show small immediate wins and also some-
times smaller losses thus cause win upon repeated choice in the
long run, so these are advantageous decks.
Healthy participants developed anticipatory skin conductance
responses (SCRs) when playing with bad decks before they had
explicit knowledge of the advantageousness of the decks and
could decide advantageously (Bechara et al., 1997). Bechara et al.
(1994, 1997, 2000), Damasio (1994), Bechara and Damasio (2005)
used the somatic marker hypotheses (SMHs) to explain the par-
ticipants’ performance in IGT and they paid special attention
to the guidance of somatic marker (emotional) signal which
reﬂected the body state changes to decision-making behavior.
Speciﬁcally, the bodily generated somatic signals such as SCRs
were different to advantageous and disadvantageous decks before
participants got explicit knowledge to the task, thus participants
could make advantageous decisions. However, theoretical expla-
nations to IGT are still under debate (see Dunn et al., 2006).
Researchers represented by Maia and McClelland (2004, 2005)
emphasized the role of cognitive processes in decision-making,
such as working memory (WM). Previous studies showed incon-
sistent results on the role of WM in IGT performance (e.g.,
Hinson et al., 2002; Turnbull et al., 2005; Pecchinenda et al.,
2006).
WM IN IGT
The most direct evidence for the relationship between IGT and
WM comes from dual-task paradigm studies in which the effect of
WM load on IGT performance were explored. The earliest study
was conducted by Hinson et al. (2002). They adopted a task sim-
ilar to IGT but more difﬁcult. The task included three decks of
cards, one advantageous deck, one neutral deck and one disad-
vantageous deck. They set three WM load conditions: high WM
load (keep ﬁve randomized digits inmemory), lowWM load (ran-
dom number generation), and no WM load. Results showed that
the participants performed poorer in theWM conditions, and the
anticipatory SCRs were also impaired. The authors suggested that
WM was helpful for the development of SCRs. With WM load,
the somatic markers may not develop, thus the decision-making
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performance was impaired. In their following study (Jameson
et al., 2004), they explored whether the secondary task affect IGT
performance through the interference to the central executive or
the phonological loop. They also used an adapted IGT (four decks
of cards: one advantageous, one neutral and two disadvantageous
decks). They set three interference conditions: no WM interfer-
ence (press the digit key presented on the screen), phonological
loop interference (pronounce“the”repeatedly), and central execu-
tive interference (to maintain random digits). Results showed that
compared to central executive interference condition, participants
mademore advantageous choices in the other two conditions, and
the performance increased with time. Anticipatory SCRs showed
difference between“advantageous”and“neutral/disadvantageous”
choices in the phonological loop interference and no WM inter-
ference conditions, but no such differences were found in the
central executive interference condition. The authors concluded
that the central executive resources were required for the devel-
opment of somatic makers. If the central executive is interrupted,
somatic markers would not develop and IGT performance would
be impaired.
In the studies of Hinson et al. (2002) and Jameson et al. (2004),
they adapted the IGT to a large extent (for example, they only had
80 trials, they did not have two advantageous and two disadvanta-
geous decks), and they used within subject design. Turnbull et al.
(2005) used the standard IGT and set three conditions: no sec-
ondary task, phonological inhibition secondary task (report digits
1–9 in order), and central executive secondary task (randomnum-
ber generation). They used a between subject design, and results
showed that these three conditions did not show signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in the rate of learning in the IGT. This result became the
important evidence that the IGT performance was independent of
WM interference. However, the no secondary task group showed
a trend of better performance than the other two groups, which
affected the power of their explanation.
For the reason of the inconsistent results, Pecchinenda et al.
(2006) suggested that in previous studies the positions of decks
were ﬁxed, whichmay allow participants to use different strategies,
such as maintaining the information of spatial positions of decks
which would rely on WM function. In their study, they changed
the positions of decks for each trial. Other parameters were the
same as the standard IGT. They set two conditions: the high WM
load condition in which they used the same task as in Hinson et al.
(2002), i.e., to maintain random digits, and the low WM load
condition in which participants needed to recall successive digits.
This study used a between subject design. Results showed that in
general the participants showed a linear learning trend, but only
participants in the lowWM load group chose advantageous decks
more often. Their net score were signiﬁcantly different from zero
from block three, while participants in the high WM load group
did not. The authors suggested that IGT performance depended
on WM functions.
Other approaches were also used to examine the relationship
between WM and IGT performance, such as relational studies.
Toplak et al. (2010) reviewed studies that examined the cognitive
explanations on IGT. Fifteen studies measuring both WM and
IGT were reviewed, and only one study reported signiﬁcant rela-
tionship between WM and IGT performance. Thus Toplak et al.
(2010) suggested IGT performance was relatively independent of
WM ability. Recently, Bagneux et al. (2013) adopted an individual
difference approach to identify individuals with high and lowWM
capacity and asked them to conduct the IGT. The results showed
that the high WM capacity individuals performed more advanta-
geously in the IGT, which suggested the role of WM in uncertain
decision-making.
Generally speaking, results on the role of WM in IGT per-
formance were mixed. Damasio (1994), who proposed the SMH
once suggested that one of the functions of somatic markers was
to lead which choices need to be processed by WM, and allo-
cate attention resources to them. In other words, successful IGT
solution involves two steps. One was the generation of somatic
markers to tell good or bad choice, and the other was to use these
signals to allocate WM and attention resources to good choice.
In this sense, the emotional and cognitive factors interacted in
the decision-making process. From the neural basis perspective,
the amygdale and ventromedial prefrontal cortex are reported to
play an important role in the development of somatic makers.
Brain lesion studies and neuroimaging studies in healthy partici-
pants showed that ventromedial prefrontal cortex, amygdale, and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were involved in IGT performance
(Bechara et al., 1994, 1996; Fellows and Farah, 2005a; Martinez-
Selva et al., 2006). Studies also suggested that dorsolateral and
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex were involved inWM performance
(Wager and Smith, 2003; Owen et al., 2005). Therefore, the IGT
and WM shared some neural mechanisms. Thus, if we add a WM
load to the IGT, the performance of IGT might be affected.
THE PRESENT STUDY
There are several limitations in the previous studies: ﬁrst, par-
ticipants were free to choose cards from any deck in the previous
studies, thus participantsmight play perseveratively from the same
deck instead of sampling more broadly. Past studies did not rule
out the possibility that differences in IGT performance caused by
WM load might be at least in part caused by WM load related
search strategies rather than their decision-making abilities. Sec-
ond, few studies have examined the effect of WM load on IGT
performance, implicit learning, and explicit cognition in a single
study, which makes the speciﬁc role of WM in IGT performance
remains unclear yet. For example, whether WM load interferes
the implicit learning, explicit cognition or other factors that affect
IGT performance was not known.
The present study further investigated the effect of WM load
on decision-making by using a dual task paradigm. The aim was
to understand the role of cognitive resources (WM) on IGT per-
formances. In order to overcome the inﬂuences of the searching
strategies in decision-making process and to exclude the inﬂuence
of participants’ willingness to explore all the decks (Cauffman
et al., 2010), we used a single choice version of IGT (Cui et al.,
2013, in preparation) in this study. In this version of IGT, par-
ticipants were assigned a deck by the computer on each trial and
required tomake a decision whether to play with or pass that deck.
The four decks were assigned to participants equally often. There-
fore, the inﬂuence of WM load on searching strategies would be
avoided. We also examined the effect of WM load on the implicit
learning and explicit cognition of the IGT by including a second
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stage task and some questions. In the second stage, there was a
free choice block without feedback for each trial but a total feed-
back for that whole block. This stage assessed participants’ implicit
learning effect (Stocco and Fum, 2008). After ﬁnishing the second
stage, participants were required to answer some paper-and-pencil
questions on explicit knowledge of the IGT (Maia andMcClelland,
2004; Guillaume et al., 2009).
Further adaptations were made on the task: ﬁrst, it was argued
that the reward and punishment schedule in the original IGT was
too simple (Gozzi et al., 2011). Participants only needed to attend
to the value of loss in the task, since the magnitude of wins were
ﬁxed (50 or 100) in the task (Cauffman et al., 2010). The present
study made some changes on the magnitude of reward of each
card, rather than adopting the ﬁxed reward 50 or 100. Second,
in order to avoid difﬁculties in explanation to a mixed reward
and punishment in feedback, we adopted a net score feedback for
each card (the feedback is either win or loss in each trial instead of
presenting bothwin and loss to participants as in the original task).
Third, Bagneux et al. (2013) suggested that increasing the total
number of trials might allow participants to develop a tendency to
make advantageous choices, so we included 200 trials in the ﬁrst
stage.
We held the following hypothesis: based on previous dual-task
paradigm studies and theoretical analysis of SMH, we predicted
thatWM load would affect the learning process, and cause poorer
IGT performance. Performance in the high, low and noWM load
groups would show a linear increasing trend. We further expected
that participants in the three conditions would show different
implicit learning effect and explicit cognition on the IGT. Implicit
learning and explicit cognition would also show a linear increasing
trend in the high, low and no WM load groups.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Ninety volunteers (45 males and 45 females) were recruited from
university students in Beijing. They were aged between 18 and 27
(mean age 22) years old. All participants had normal or corrected
to normal vision and free of neurological or psychiatric diseases.
Participantswere randomly assigned to three WMload groups (no
WM load, low WM load, and high WM load) of IGT with equal
gender ratio as van den Bos et al. (2013) suggested that there were
gender differences in IGT performance. The three groups did not
show signiﬁcant difference in years of education [F(2,87) = 1.20,
p = 0.305].
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Beijing
Normal University. Participants were paid for their participa-
tion. In order to enhance the participants’ motivation, they were
informed before the experiment that they would get additional
reward according to their IGT performance. They had a minimal
pay of 50 RMB, if their ﬁnal earning was larger than 1000, then
they would earn additional 5 RMB for every 500 points.
EXPERIMENTAL TASKS
Iowa Gambling Task
The original IGT was adapted in this study. The modiﬁed IGT
consisted of two stages. The ﬁrst stage took a single choice mode
with feedback for each trial. In each trial, four decks of cards were
presented on the screen, with one of them embedded in a yellow
border, which indicated that one card from this deck was assigned
by the computer. The participants were asked to decide whether to
play with the card or not. If they decided to play, they should press
the “←” key; if pass, press “→”. If the participants responded to
play, the amount of reward or punishment for this trial (feedback)
would be presented on the screen and added to the running total
which was on the screen all the time. If the participants decided to
pass, the feedback on the screen was “Pass”, with the running total
unchanged. The feedback would be presented for 1000 ms. Then
the next trial appeared. In each block (20 trials), ﬁve cards would
be chosen from each of four decks. The four decks were assigned
to participants at a random order. The task ﬂow was shown in
Figure 1.
Participants were made clear before the task that each deck
had its own reward and punishment rules, and contained enough
cards. Each time the computer would randomly select a card from
the designated deck. If the participants chose to play with a card,
that card would be turned over and taken out of that deck; if the
participants chose to pass a card, that card would not be turned
over and none would be taken away. Since there were plenty of
cards in each deck, the number of playswould not affect the reward
and punishment rules of a given deck. The payoff schedule was a
bit different from the original IGT and was shown in Table 1.
Speciﬁcally, the reward was not ﬁxed to 100 or 50 but varied.
Instead of presenting reward and punishment at the same time,
we only presented the net reward or punishment to participants.
The card was set at a ﬁxed pseudorandom order. The card passed
by participants still remained on the top of that deck. If the partic-
ipant was assigned the same deck the next time and chose to play,
it was still that card. This setting was to ensure that the expected
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of experiment flow.
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Table 1 | Payoff schedule in the adapted IGT.
Payoff schedule Deck
A B C D
Range of gains 80∼130 80∼130 40∼70 40∼70
Range of losses –50∼–250 –1150 –5∼–25 –200
Percentage of net gain 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9
Percentage of net loss 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1
Position of the ﬁrst loss 3 9 3 10
Expected value of 10
consecutive choice
–250 –250 200 250
The outcomes of Deck A include: 100, 100, 80, 90, 130, –50, –100, –150, –200,
–250. The outcomes of Deck B include: 100, 100, 100, 100, 80, 80, 90, 120, 130,
–1150. The outcomes of Deck C include: 50, 50, 40, 60, 70, –5, –10, –15, –15,
–25. The outcomes of Deck D include: 50, 50, 50, 50, 40, 40, 40, 60, 70, –200.
value of each deck was consistent with the original design, and
kept the same for all participants. However, the participants were
not aware of this design. The total number of trials was not told
to participants either.
In order to get enough number of plays by participants, the ﬁrst
stage included 200 trials according to the ratio of play in Cauffman
et al.’s (2010) study. Then the second stage began. This stage was
to assess the implicit learning effect. Based on Stocco and Fum’s
(2008) study, this stage included a free choice block. In this stage,
the computer did not assign a deck for participants to play or pass.
Instead, the participants were asked to freely choose cards from
any deck for 20 times. And they did not get feedback for each
selection but only a total feedback for these selections at the end
of this stage.
After the IGT, participants were required to ﬁll a paper-and-
pencil questionnaire, this was to assess their explicit cognition on
IGT. Based onGuillaume et al.’s (2009) study, it included questions
from four aspects: (1) What do you know about this task? (2) Do
you ﬁnd differences among these decks? (3) Suppose you will pick
ten new cards from Deck A/B/C/D, will you win or lose? (one
question for each deck) (4) If you were given another chance to
play this game, but you can only choose from one deck, which
deck will you choose from in order to win as much as possible?
For questions (1) and (2), correct judgments of advantageousness
of each deck scored 0.5; correct descriptions of win or loss of each
deck scored 0.5; for question (3), each correct answer scored 1; for
question (4), if the participants chose advantageous deck (C or D),
they would get 1 score; if they chose disadvantageous deck (A or
B), they would not get score. As a result, the maximum score of
explicit cognition on IGT was 9.
WM load was manipulated through a dual-task paradigm by
embedding a secondary digit recall task to the IGT. There were
three WM load conditions: no WM load, low WM load and high
WM load conditions. The no WM load condition was described
as above. In the lowWM load condition, the participant needed to
keep 3 random digits in memory, such as “275”, while in the high
WM load condition, the participant needed to keep 7 random
digits in memory, such as “8129365”. When the participant was
prompted to recall the digits, he/she needed to input the digits in
order through keyboard. A string of digits was presented on the
computer screen before the decision on cards started. When the
participant remembered the digit string, he/she could press any
key to start the ﬁrst stage of the IGT. Then he/she needed to recall
the digit string after 10 trials of card selection. After he/she recalled
the digit string they remembered last time, a new digit string was
presented on the screen for him/her to remember. Participants
needed to recall the digit strings every 10 trials of card selection. In
the WM load groups, both stage one and stage two contained this
secondary task. Before the formal experiment, there was a practice
on the secondary task (digit string recall task). The accuracy of
the secondary task is the proportion of correctly recalled digits
(with correct position) to the total number of digits needs to be
memorized.
WM task used to compare participants’ WM capacity in different
groups
The calculation span task modiﬁed from Grant and Dagenbach
(2000) was used in the present study to assess participants’ WM
capacity. The main purpose of including this task was to conﬁrm
the participants that randomly assigned to different conditions
did not show signiﬁcant difference in WM capacity. There was
addition or subtraction formula presented at the center of the
computer screen. The numbers in the formula were no larger than
15, and the participants were required to determine whether the
formula was correct or not (press “←” if correct and press “→”
if incorrect). At the same time, they should remember the sec-
ond number in the formula. Each formula presented no longer
than 4000 ms. Once the participant made a response, the next
formula appeared. After a consecutive set of formulas presented,
the participant was required to recall the numbers he/she just
remembered in order by inputting them with keyboard. For-
mulas were generated by computer randomly with the following
rules: the second number was different from the result num-
ber; and the second numbers in two consecutive formulas were
different.
The number of formulas in each set ranged from 2 to 7. Each
contained three sets, resulted in a total of 18 sets. The participants
got one score if they correctly recalled one number (with correct
position). The score ranged from 0 to 81. Two sets of practice were
conducted before the formal test.
PROCEDURE
After a general introduction to the experiment, the participants
were free to ask questions. The formal experiment began after
participants signing the informed consent form. The participants
were tested individually. They ﬁnished the IGT ﬁrst. After a rest,
they were administered the WM task. The order of the tasks was
the same as in Bagneux et al. (2013).
DATA ANALYSIS
First, WM task performance was compared among the three
groups to examine whether they showed signiﬁcant difference in
WM capacity. Second, as it was usual for IGT, participants’ per-
formance was measured by dividing the trials into blocks of 20
consecutive choices, and calculating the block net score (subtract-
ing number of plays for disadvantageous decks A and B from
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 162 | 4
Cui et al. Effect ofWM load on IGT performance
number of plays for advantageous decks C and D). The block
net score was compared among different WM load groups. Third,
the choices on each deck among different groups were compared.
Fourth, the implicit learning effect in stage two was compared
among groups. Fifth, the explicit cognition of IGT was compared
among groups. In these analyses, for the block effects and inter-
action effects, Greenhouse–Geisser correction was used to adjust
degrees of freedom. Based on results in the previous studies, we
expected a linear trend in IGT performance among the high WM
load, low WM load and no WM load groups, thus we made a
planned linear contrast after examining the main effect of WM
load.
RESULTS
COMPARISON OF WM PERFORMANCE FOR PARTICIPANTS IN
DIFFERENT WM LOAD GROUPS
This study aimed to explore the effect of WM load on IGT per-
formance.We compared the participants’WM capacity to exclude
its confounding on IGT performance. The scores of WM task
(calculation span) were M = 77.9 (SD = 5.45) for the no WM
load group; M = 78.8 (SD = 3.05) for the low WM load group;
M = 78.0 (SD = 3.18) for the high WM load group respectively.
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that the difference
was not signiﬁcant, F(2,87) = 0.44, p = 0.645, η2p = 0.010.
COMPARISON OF IGT BLOCK NET SCORE IN DIFFERENT GROUPS
To ensure participants in different conditions accomplished tasks
according to task requirements, we compared their secondary task
performance in the high and lowWM load groups. Results showed
that participants were highly accurate in recalling the digits, and
the accuracy were M low = 0.983 (SD = 0.020) and Mhigh = 0.975
(SD = 0.035) for the low and high WM load groups respectively.
One-way ANOVA showed that the difference was not signiﬁcant,
F(1,58) = 1.36, p = 0.249, η2p = 0.023. The result suggested that
the manipulation of secondary WM task was effective.
The block net score in each WM load group is shown
in Figure 2. A 3 (WM load) × 10 (Block) mixed ANOVA
was conducted with block net score as the dependent vari-
able. Results showed that there was a signiﬁcant main effect of
FIGURE 2 | Block net score in eachWM load group.
Block, F(6.61,575.04) = 4.57, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.050. There
was a marginally signiﬁcant effect of WM load, F(2,87) = 2.95,
p = 0.057, η2p = 0.064. Planned contrast showed a linear trend
among the three conditions (the linear contrast was signiﬁ-
cant, p = 0.021, and the quadratic contrast was not signiﬁcant,
p = 0.534). TheWM load × Block interaction was not signiﬁcant,
F(13.22,575.04) = 0.64, p = 0.871, η2p = 0.014.
To further explore the learning effect in each group, we
compared the net score of each block with 0. The results are
shown in Table 2. Bonferroni correction was used for this anal-
ysis, thus the threshold for signiﬁcance was 0.005. It can be
seen that the no WM load group showed block net score larger
than 0 for block 4, 5, 8, and 9. However, none of the low
WM load or high WM load group showed a block net score
larger than 0 after Bonferroni corrections. These results indi-
cated that WM load inﬂuenced participants’ learning process of
decision-making.
THE ANALYSIS OF CHOICE ON EACH DECK IN DIFFERENT GROUPS
A 3 (WM load) × 10 (Block) × 4 (Deck) mixed ANOVA was
conducted, and results indicated that: the main effect of Deck
was signiﬁcant, F(3,261) = 14.55, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.143. Fur-
ther analysis revealed that number of plays in Decks C and D
was signiﬁcantly larger than that of Decks A and B (Bonfer-
roni corrected). The main effect of WM load was signiﬁcant,
F(2,87) = 5.22, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.107. Planned contrast indi-
cated a linear trend among the three groups (the linear contras
was signiﬁcant, p = 0.002, and the quadratic contrast was not
signiﬁcant, p = 0.426). The Deck × WM load interaction was sig-
niﬁcant, F(4.70,204.34) = 3.11, p = 0.012, η2p = 0.067; and the
Deck×Block interactionwas signiﬁcant,F(17.42,1515.17)= 3.32,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.037. Figure 3 indicated that the trends of
four decks changing over time were different among groups.
The Deck × WM load × Block three-way interaction was not
signiﬁcant, F(34.83,1515.17) = 0.72, p = 0.887, η2p = 0.016.
The simple effect analysis of Deck × WM load interaction
revealed that the number of plays in Deck A was signiﬁcantly
different among WM load groups, F(2,87) = 9.63, p < 0.001.
Planned contrast indicated a linear trend among the three groups
(the linear contrast was signiﬁcant, p < 0.001, and the quadratic
contrast was not signiﬁcant, p = 0.812). Decks B, C, and D did not
show signiﬁcant difference among groups.
The simple effect analysis of Deck × Block interaction
revealed that the main effect of Block was signiﬁcant in Deck B,
F(6.19,550.68) = 4.40, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.047, that participants
tend to play less with Deck B over the course of the task. The main
effect of Block was signiﬁcant in Deck C, F(6.92,615.48) = 2.34,
p = 0.024, η2p = 0.026. Participants tend to play more with Deck
C over the course of the task. The main effect of Block was signiﬁ-
cant in Deck D, F(7.21,641.87) = 4.87, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.052, that
participants tend to play more with Deck D over the course of the
task.
From Figure 3 and the above results we could ﬁnd that the
number of plays in Deck B decreased across blocks in each WM
load group. At the same time participants showed a preference
for Deck D, but for another disadvantageous Deck (Deck A), they
were less played with only in the no WM load group.
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Table 2 |Test of difference from zero for block net score in eachWM load group.
Block NoWM load group LowWM load group HighWM load group
Net score M t p Net score M t p Net score M t p
1 –0.40 –1.29 0.206 –0.27 –0.59 0.558 –0.33 –1.06 0.300
2 0.40 0.97 0.339 0.47 1.08 0.291 0.07 0.23 0.821
3 0.57 1.95 0.061 0.20 0.71 0.483 0.13 0.54 0.595
4 1.00 3.26 0.003 0.63 2.00 0.055 0.03 0.10 0.921
5 1.40 3.27 0.003 0.47 1.85 0.075 0.30 1.03 0.313
6 1.27 2.57 0.016 0.63 2.35 0.026 0.53 1.39 0.174
7 1.53 2.62 0.014 0.77 2.09 0.046 0.57 2.66 0.012
8 1.40 3.25 0.003 0.60 2.07 0.048 0.07 0.27 0.787
9 1.57 3.11 0.004 0.70 2.46 0.020 0.80 2.05 0.050
10 1.03 1.63 0.114 0.70 1.77 0.087 0.93 2.94 0.06
The signiﬁcance of bold values is p < 0.005.
FIGURE 3 | Number of plays for each deck in each block under threeWM load groups.
THE INFLUENCE OF WM LOAD ON IMPLICIT LEARNING EFFECTS
We analyzed participants’ choices in stage two in each WM load
group. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect
of WM load on the net score of this block, and result revealed
no main effect of WM load, F(2,87) = 0.82, p = 0.443. However,
the comparison between net score and 0 indicated that the net
scores in noWM load [t(29) = 2.65, p = 0.013] and lowWM load
[t(29) = 3.69, p< 0.001] groups were signiﬁcantly different from
0, while in high WM load group, it was not signiﬁcant different
from 0 [t(29) = 1.28, p = 0.212].
A 3 (WM load) × 4 (Deck) repeated measures ANOVA
revealed that the WM load × Deck interaction was not signiﬁ-
cant, F(5.51,239.51) = 1.50, p = 0.178, η2p = 0.033, which meant
participants showed relatively consistent trend in selecting cards
among three WM load groups.
COMPARISON OF EXPLICIT COGNITION ON IGT AMONG DIFFERENT
GROUPS
The scores of explicit cognition on the IGT under different WM
load were: M = 4.5 (SD = 2.50) for the no WM load group;
M = 4.2 (SD = 1.63) for the low WM load group; M = 4.9
(SD = 2.17) for the high WM load group. One-way ANOVA
showed that the main effect of WM load was not signiﬁcant,
F(2,87) = 0.82, p = 0.446, η2p = 0.018. At the same time, the rela-
tionships between explicit cognition score and total net score in
stage one was signiﬁcant only in the noWM load group: r = 0.58,
p < 0.001. For the low WM load group, r = 0.27, p = 0.156; for
the high WM load group, r = 0.30, p = 0.111.
We also analyzed participants’ favorite deck (Table 3). Chi-
square test revealed that the deck preference under different WM
load groups was not signiﬁcantly different, χ2 = 1.65, p = 0.949.
DISCUSSION
In this study we employed a modiﬁed version of IGT which could
avoid the inﬂuence of WM load on searching strategies, and
explored the effect of WM load on uncertain decision-making.
The main ﬁndings were: the WM load had a marginal effect
on IGT net score; further analysis indicated the IGT perfor-
mance showed a linear increasing trend among high WM load,
low WM load and no WM load groups. Participants in the
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Table 3 | Frequency of favorite decks reported by participants in each
WM load group.
Group Favorite deck Sum
A B C D
NoWM load group 6 5 7 12 30
LowWM load group 7 5 6 12 30
HighWM load group 5 3 8 14 30
Sum 18 13 21 38 90
no WM load group played less with Deck A than the low and
high WM load groups; participants in the no WM load group
played less with Deck B than the high WM load group. Partici-
pants in the three groups did not show signiﬁcant difference on
implicit learning effect. However, the no and lowWM load groups
showed a learning effect signiﬁcantly different from 0, yet the
high WM load group did not. All three groups reached a same
level of explicit cognition on IGT. We discussed these results in
turn.
THE INFLUENCE OF WM LOAD ON IGT PERFORMANCE
The present study adopted a dual task paradigm to investigate
the effect of WM load on IGT performance. The basic logic of
dual task paradigm is that if the two tasks depend on the same
cognitive resources, the secondary tasks would reduce cognitive
resources available for the primary task, and as a result the perfor-
mance of the primary task will be affected. In the present study,
we employed a modiﬁed version of IGT which could avoid the
inﬂuence of WM load on searching strategies which might be
a confounding factor in previous studies. Analysis on block net
score revealed that the main effect of WM load was marginally
signiﬁcant. Planned contrast revealed block net score showed a
linear trend among the three groups which indicated an inter-
ference role of WM load on IGT performance. The interaction
between Block and WM load was not signiﬁcant. These results
suggested that all the three groups showed a learning effect, which
can be seen from Figure 2. We compared block net score in dif-
ferent WM load groups with 0, and results showed that block
net score of the no WM load group was signiﬁcantly higher than
0 from block 4 (except for block 6, 7, 10), while none of the
block net score in the low WM load group or the high WM
load group did so. This might mean the inﬂuence of WM load
on the learning process of decision-making. It was consistent
with previous studies that WM played a role in IGT perfor-
mance (Hinson et al., 2002; Jameson et al., 2004; Pecchinenda
et al., 2006; Bagneux et al., 2013). Nevertheless, these results were
not consistent with some studies (Turnbull et al., 2005; Gozzi
et al., 2011). This might be because we used different versions
of IGT, and different secondary task were used. We used a single
choice version of IGT that excluded the potential confounding
of attention focus shifting and searching strategies (Cauffman
et al., 2010), while previous studies used other versions of IGT.
For the secondary task, the random number generation task used
in previous studies can be self-paced and might be slowed down
when WM was required, thus it might not be a good task tax-
ing WM resources (Pecchinenda et al., 2006). But in the present
study, participants needed to maintain a digit string all through
the task and was a valid secondary WM task. Moreover, analysis
of secondary task accuracy also revealed that it was high in both
WM load groups (higher than 0.97). This indicated that partic-
ipants performed the secondary task carefully according to task
requirements, and it also suggested that the dual-task setting was
effective. Meanwhile, we measured the WM capacity of partici-
pants and excluded the potential confounding of individual’sWM
capacities.
We further analyzed the choices on four decks in each WM
load group, and results indicated that the number of plays on
Deck B in all groups showed the same trend that declined signiﬁ-
cantly over the course of the task. They all showed preference for
Decks C and D, but for disadvantageous Deck A, there was a lin-
ear trend in the three groups’ choices, which indicated that WM
load had disturbed the participants’ ability to identify Deck A as a
disadvantageous deck. This is consistent with Pecchinenda et al.’s
(2006) study. They found that for disadvantageous Deck A, WM
load had an effect on participants’ choice. But for advantageous
Deck C,WM load did not have an effect. That means participants
in low WM load group could discriminate Deck A and Deck C,
while participants in highWM load group could not discriminate
these two decks in their study. In the present study, participants
in the no WM load group could discriminate Deck A and Deck
C, while participants in the high WM load group could not dis-
criminate these two decks. Since both Deck A and C had high
frequency of loss, it was not the case thatWM load only affects the
participants’ ability to maintain the advantageousness of a deck
by keeping the number of wins/losses associated with that deck.
Rather the implicit learning of the advantageousness of decks in
the IGT relies on WM to maintain multiple information of decks
(Pecchinenda et al., 2006). However, it should be cautious to com-
pare our results to previous studies directly, because we used a
different version of IGT. Furthermore, even in WM load groups,
participants showed avoidance for Deck B in the single choice ver-
sion, which was consistent with previous studies (Cui et al., 2013,
in preparation).
THE INFLUENCE OF WM LOAD ON IMPLICIT LEARNING EFFECTS AND
EXPLICIT COGNITION
In this study, we added a stage in which no single-trial feedback
was provided to examine the participants’ implicit learning effects.
The results of this stage suggested that net score of this stage was
not signiﬁcantly different among the three groups. Net score of
no WM load group and low WM load group was larger than 0,
while it was not differently different from 0 in the high WM load
group. These results suggested that the implicit learning in the IGT
somewhat depended on cognitive resources, and implicit learning
might play a role in decision-making.
The analysis on the participants’ explicit cognition of IGT
and favorite deck revealed that they all presented explicit knowl-
edge to IGT, which is consistent with previous studies (Maia and
McClelland, 2004; Guillaume et al., 2009). Moreover, the explicit
cognition in the no WM load group was correlated with IGT per-
formance which was also consistent with Guillaume et al. (2009).
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We also extended previous studied by showing that the threeWM
load groups did not show signiﬁcant difference on explicit cogni-
tion of IGT. These results suggested that WM load did not affect
participants’ explicit cognition at the end of the task. Neverthe-
less, since we believe that multiple assessment of explicit cognition
might provide clue to subjects and make them aware (Persaud
et al., 2007), we just assessed the explicit cognition once at the end
of the task. Therefore, we could not know whether there would be
difference in explicit cognition in the middle of the task or not.
Whether the acquirement of explicit knowledgewas also delayed in
participants with WM load, like IGT net score, should be studied
further.
The participants in the high WM load group were some-
what similar to ventromedial prefrontal lesion patients that they
showed explicit cognition to the task. However, they did not follow
their knowledge and performed disadvantageously (Bechara et al.,
1997). It might be that central executive resources are required for
developing somatic markers (Jameson et al., 2004). Participants
in the high WM load group whose dorsolateral and ventrolateral
prefrontal functions were interfered did not have enough central
executive resources, thus they did not develop somatic makers
which involved the functions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex to
guide them to make advantageous decisions.
Overall, the results of present study indicated that thoughWM
load affect the learningprocesses, the learning effect of IGTwasnot
entirely dependent onWM since the explicit cognition in the high
WM load group reached a similar level as in other two groups.
If the WM resource affected the participants’ learning speed, it
might be useful to increase the number of trials to provide enough
learning experience and to see whether theWM resource is related
to the emergence of hunches (Bagneux et al., 2013). In the present
study, we had a total of 200 trials and provide enough learning
experiences and found out that WM load affected the learning
process but not the explicit cognition on IGT.
IS THE COGNITIVE EXPLANATION ABOUT IGT REASONABLE?
For people’s IGT task performance, Damasio (1994) and Bechara
et al. (1997) emphasized the role of body generated emotional
signals (somatic states) in guiding the decision-making behav-
ior. Some researchers suggested other explanations (e.g., Fellows
and Farah, 2003; Maia and McClelland, 2004). They argued
that WM, reversal learning/inhibition, risk preference and other
cognitive factors also played a role in IGT performance (see
Dunn et al., 2006). In this study, the WM hypothesis was tested
and has been partially supported. WM affected the perfor-
mance and implicit learning but not explicit cognition. Other
cognitive explanations such as reversal learning, risk prefer-
ence were not explored. Our results revealed that other factors
might play a role in IGT performance. And our ERP study pro-
vided more direct evidence on the role of emotion (Cui et al.,
2013).
Previous researches have looked for evidence for these theo-
retical explanations in special populations (e.g., VMPFC patients
Bechara et al., 1998; Fellows and Farah, 2003, 2005b; Sanfey et al.,
2003; Shiv et al., 2005; schizophrenia Turnbull et al., 2006; etc.).
This study may not respond to these controversies because we
only recruited healthy participants. Perhaps as Dunn et al. (2006)
suggested, different interpretations did not necessarily mutually
exclusive, and different mechanisms might be involved in suc-
cessful IGT performance. Impairment in any component would
affect task performance, and different mechanisms might explain
different aspects of tasks or performances in different populations.
There are several limitations in the study. First, study indi-
cated that children with high socioeconomic status performed
better on Children’s Gambling Task compared to children with
low socioeconomic status (Mata et al., 2013). The socioeconomic
status may also inﬂuence young adults’ IGT performance. How-
ever, the socioeconomic level of the students was not recorded in
the present study. Second, Jameson et al. (2004) suggested that the
central executive resources were required in the development of
somaticmarkers and IGTperformance.Yetwedidnot record SCRs
in this study, as a result we could not make a causal conclusion on
the role of WM and somatic makers in IGT performance. Third,
the task in the high WM load condition might not be challenging
enough, this might cause the marginal effect of WM load on IGT
performance.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, the present study revealed that WM played a par-
tial role in IGT performance. Patients in the highWM load group
showed explicit cognition to the task but still decided disadvanta-
geously. The results indicated that itmight be consistentwith SMH
that participants are guided by their emotions when performing
the IGT. Nevertheless, this study mainly investigated the effect of
WM on the IGT performance. The role of emotion was inferred
and indirect. And we suggested further studies should explore the
role of emotion in IGT performance more directly.
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